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Deterrence and Antitrust Punishment: Firms versus Agents 
 
 







Abstract: Antitrust enforcement regimes rely on two types of penalties for deterrence: penalties 
against the violating firm and penalties against the agents of the violating firm. In this paper I 
examine the economics of punishing agents versus firms.  My area of application is antitrust, but 
the argument applies generally to other fields in which the government has the choice between 
punishing the agent, the firm, or both.  This analysis suggests that whenever the firm has an 
incentive, given existing penalties, to engage in some illegal act that may result in relatively 
modest punishment for its agents, it can almost always induce its agents to carry out the illegal 
act.  It follows that almost any plausible effort to use penalties against agents to deter price fixing 
can be undone by the firm’s own system of rewards for agents.  For deterrence, penalties against 
the firm sufficient to eliminate the firm’s incentive to fix prices are necessary. 
  
                                                 
 William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University, Professor of Law, Boston University School 
of Law.  knhylton@bu.edu. This paper was prepared for the Symposium Honoring Herb Hovenkamp at the 
University of Iowa College of Law, October 23-24, 2014.  For helpful comments I thank Roger Blair, Bob Lande, 
Danny Sokol, and symposium participants. 





Antitrust enforcement regimes rely on two types of penalties for deterrence: penalties against the 
violating firm and penalties against the agents of the violating firm.  Probably the main 
difference between the U.S. and the EU enforcement regimes is that the U.S. tends to rely more 
on penalties against the agents to deter violations while the EU tends to rely on penalties against 
the firm.1  In the U.S., an antitrust violation can result in a fine against the firm and a prison 
sentence for the agents who carried out the anticompetitive actions.  In the EU, a fine against the 
firm is the sole punishment in the vast majority of cases.2 
 
The penalty structure in the U.S. persists even though Gary Becker, in 1968, argued quite 
forcefully that a policy of using monetary fines against firms would be more efficient than the 
existing U.S. punishment system.3  Monetary fines could be imposed with relatively little cost to 
society, and would amount to a transfer of resources from the convicted firm to the government, 
and perhaps from there the transfer could be used to compensate victims.  Prison sentences, by 
contrast, impose a cost on society by forfeiting the labor of the convicted agent, and taxing the 
productive sector of society to pay for the agent’s upkeep during incarceration.  In addition, at 
least some of the agents convicted in Sherman Act cases are experienced and productive workers 
within their industries.4  Becker suggested that it would be better to let them continue to work, 
deterred from future antitrust violations, than to lock them up in prison cells for several years.5 
 
The question of optimality in punishment has come to the fore recently with discussions around 
revising the Criminal Sentencing Guidelines.6  Ginsburg and Wright recently proposed a shift 
toward greater punishment for the agent, by debarring convicted agents from work in their 
fields.7  Connor and Lande argue that the preferable reform would not pile more punishment on 
agents, but would raise the penalties imposed on firms.8  They present evidence that penalties in 
                                                 
1 Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Sanctions, Antitrust Sanctions, 6 COMP. POL’Y INT’L 3, 20 
(2010); Gregor Erbach, EU and US competition policies: Similar objectives, different approaches, (Mar. 27, 2014) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=LDM_BRI(2014)140779 
Donald I. Baker, Deterring Cartels – The Criminalization Dimension, (Mar. 23, 2012), 
http://www.tca.ie/images/uploaded/documents/2012-03-23%20Baker%20-%20Deterring%20Cartels-
%20The%20criminalisation%20dimension%20-%20paper.pdf.  
2 Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 1, at 17-19. 
3 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 193-99 (1968). 
4 US v. Andreas, No. 96 CR 762, 1999 WL 515484, at *16 (LCrR. July 15, 1999). The vice chairman of Archer 
Daniels Midland Corp. and two former executives are sentenced to prison terms after being convicted of price 
fixing; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Denso Corp. Executive Agrees to Plead Guilty to Price Fixing on 
Automobile Parts Installed in U.S. Cars (June 30, 2014) available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/306795.htm. 
5 Becker, supra note 3, at 193-98. 
6 In June 2014, the United States Sentencing Commission issued a notice in the Federal Register that it is conducting 
a study of antitrust offenses, including examination of fine provisions governing bid-rigging, price-fixing, and 
market allocation agreements.  See 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/333024/Cartels+Monopolies/Criminal+Antitrust+Fines+Trends+and+Recen
t+Developments.   For public comments in response to the notice, see http://www.ussc.gov/amendment-
process/public-comment/public-comment-july-29-2014.  
7 Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 1.   
8 John M. Connor and Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 
428, 435-442 (2012). 
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the U.S. are too low to provide optimal deterrence against cartels.9  Cartels persist, in their view, 
because the rewards are greater than the expected penalties.10 
 
In this paper I examine the economics of punishing agents versus firms.11  My area of application 
is antitrust, but the arguments apply generally to other fields in which the government has the 
choice between punishing the agent, the firm, or both.  The theory that I set out is part normative 
and part positive.  The normative part demonstrates that whenever the firm has an incentive, 
given existing penalties, to engage in some illegal act that may result in relatively modest 
punishment for its agents, it can almost always induce its agents to carry out the illegal act.  This 
proposition applies especially to price fixing, with its combination of firm and relatively modest 
agent-targeted penalties.  It follows that almost any plausible effort to use penalties against 
agents to deter price fixing can be undone by the firm’s own system of rewards for agents.  
Similarly, the firm can almost always eliminate the agent’s incentive to price fix whenever it 
does not have an incentive to fix prices (that is, the firm-level expected penalty is greater than the 
profit from price fixing).  The normative implication of these propositions is that penalties 
against the firm sufficient to eliminate the incentive to fix prices are necessary in order to deter 
price fixing.  The positive part of the analysis provides an explanation for observed patterns in 
punishment, such as the plea agreements firms negotiate with the Department of Justice defining 
which employees are subject to criminal punishment.  In particular, the observed tendency to 
impose prison sentences on mid-level employees may result in part from a rational response on 
the part of firms in assigning agents to carry out price fixing schemes and later exposing those 




I will start with a simple economic model of crime.  The model consists of one firm and one 
agent.  A crime will need the assistance of the agent to be committed.  A crime is committed 
when both the firm and the agent find that it is in their interests.   
 
The firm is assumed to be profit-maximizing and risk-neutral, which means that it will commit 
the crime whenever the expected net gain from the crime is positive.  Thus, whenever the gain to 
the firm from the crime is greater than the expected penalty (the probability of firm punishment 
multiplied by the fine imposed on the firm), the firm will commit the crime.  This may seem to 
put too little weight on internalized ethical norms, but competitive markets tend to weaken the 
internalization of such norms.  In the extreme case of a zero-profit, perfectly competitive 
environment, firms will have to adopt the cost-cutting methods of their rivals in order to survive, 
even if those methods may be unlawful. 
 
The agent is assumed to be utility-maximizing.  Thus, the agent will compare his utility in the 
state in which he does not commit the crime to his utility in the state in which he does commit 
                                                 
9 Id. at 429. 
10 Id. at 468-476. 
11 Daniel Sokol, Policing the Firm, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 785 (2014). Bruce H. 
Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency, and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Enforcement 
of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations, 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 715, 735-737 (2001) (discussing agency costs of 
cartel enforcement). See Giancarlo Spagnolo, Managerial Incentives and Collusive Behavior, 49 Eur. Econ. Rev. 
1501, 1515–16 (2005) (incentives of managers to smooth income may enhance cartel stability). 
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the crime.  If his expected utility is lower in the state in which he commits the crime, he will not 
commit the crime, and the converse holds too.  In short, the agent will commit the crime 
whenever his expected utility from compliance with the law is less than his expected utility form 





Expected  utility from 
compliance greater than 





Expected  utility from 
compliance less than 




Gain to firm from 























Both Firm and Agent 
commit 
   Table 1: Firm versus agent incentives to commit crime. 
 
 
Each of the cells in the Table above summarizes the incentives of the firm and the agent.  Let’s 
consider the cells in turn. 
 
In the first cell (top left), the firm’s gain from the crime is less than the expected penalty, and the 
agent’s expected utility from the crime is less than his expected utility from commission.  Both 
agent and firm comply with the law. 
 
The second cell shows a conflict: the firm prefers to comply with the law and the agent prefers to 
commit the crime.  In other words, the firm expects to suffer a net loss from the crime, while the 
agent expects to gain in utility.  How could this scenario arise?  First, it arises because the 
expected penalty to the firm exceeds its gain from the crime.  In addition, it arises because the 
agent expects a net gain from committing the crime and does not expect the firm to respond by 
eliminating the gain to the agent.  This might occur for several reasons.  The firm may have weak 
internal controls and may be unable to identify and punish the agent who has caused it to suffer a 
penalty.  If the firm is unable to identify the agent, it may be forced to choose between 
terminating or punishing all or a large group of employees or forgoing any effort to discipline the 
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responsible agent.  If the cost of identifying and punishing the responsible agent exceeds any 
deterrence gain the firm might get, it may forgo the discipline step, and leave itself exposed to 
future decisions by agents to commit crimes that harm the firm.  A second reason this scenario 
might arise is that the firm cannot credibly commit to impose a penalty that would deter the 
agent.  The agent may have options to leave, perhaps to rival firms, before the firm can impose 
the penalty, or the agent may provide services that are so important to the firm that penalizing the 
agent would leave both the firm and the agent worse off.12 
 
The other conflict scenario is where the firm prefers to commit the crime and the agent prefers to 
comply.  The firm needs the agent to commit the crime; the firm can do nothing on its own.  
Here it seems quite plausible that the firm could rearrange its compensation structure to give the 
agent an incentive to commit the crime.  If the agent prefers not to commit the crime because the 
expected penalty exceeds any gain he might receive, the firm can just increase the agent’s wage 
conditional on committing the crime.  Hence the outcome in which the firm prefers to commit 
the crime and the agent does not should quickly turn into the outcome in which both firm and 
agent willingly commit the crime. 
 
Agent Underdeterrence Problem  
 
Let us take a closer look at these scenarios, gradually taking into consideration features of the 
legal environment in antitrust.  Suppose the agent is risk neutral.  He therefore commits the crime 
if and only if his gain from committing the crime is greater than the expected penalty.  What is 
the expected penalty in antitrust?  It is the prison term imposed under the Sherman Act, 
discounted by the probability that the agent will be detected and prosecuted.  The average prison 
sentence for price-fixing defendants is now 25 months – or roughly 2 years.13  Thus, the penalty 
that the agent expects to receive, if he is detected and prosecuted, is the loss of wage income for 
2 years. 
 
What is the expected gain from price-fixing for the agent?  If the firm rewards the agent for the 
extra profits that his price-fixing brings in, then his gain is the reward given by his firm (or by 
another firm that hires the agent).  If the firm does not reward the agent, then the agent’s 
expected gain from price-fixing is negative, since he takes the risk that he will be imprisoned and 
gets nothing in return. 
 
Assume that the relevant time frame can be broken into two periods: the period during which the 
agent would be imprisoned if apprehended (punishment period) and the period after that (post-
punishment period).  For the average agent, the punishment period lasts two years.  The reward 
for price fixing can be given in both the punishment period and the post-punishment period. 
 
                                                 
12 On the other hand, one suspects that if the agent continually imposes a loss on the firm, eventually the firm will 
identify him as the source of the loss and discipline him.  If the firm sets a penalty that is sufficiently harsh, then 
punishment much later in the employee’s tenure may still be a sufficient deterrent.  For now, my point in the text is 
that a conflict in incentives where the employee commits a crime that harms the firm may be observed at least in the 
short run. 




To examine this question more closely, let z = probability of detection, w1 = wage during 
punishment period, w2 = wage during post-punishment period.  Let r represent the effective rate 
of interest (or discount rate) between the two periods.  In addition, let any increase in the wage 
be represented by Δw.  The net gain that the agent gets from commission of the crime is therefore 
 
           

2
1 1( ) (1 ) 1
punishment period wage loss gain if undetected
post punishment period reward
w
z w z w
r

    
 
.                           (1) 
 
The first term reflects the punishment period wage loss suffered by the agent – that is, the wage 
loss suffered by the agent if detected and punished.  The second term reflects the gain if the 
agent goes undetected and receives a reward from the firm for price fixing (or for the financial 
returns to the firm resulting from price fixing) during the punishment period.  The third term 
reflects a post-punishment reward provided by the firm.  In this expression Δw1 is the reward in 
the punishment period and Δw2 is the reward in the post-punishment period.  The firm controls 
the rewards in both periods.  The probability of detection is not under the control of firm; it is 
determined by antitrust enforcement agencies. 
 
Firm Prefers to Fix Prices 
 
Suppose the firm prefers to fix prices and gives the agent a constant reward percentage in both 
periods, and let that percentage be represented by λ.  Suppose also that wage growth is η percent 
between the two periods.  The agent’s gain from price fixing is therefore 
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    
.                      (2) 
 
Clearly, if the reward for price-fixing is zero (λ = 0), the agent’s net gain is negative and he will 
not have an incentive to fix prices.  Hence, the reward factor must be positive for the agent to 
have an incentive to fix prices. 
 
To examine how plausible it is that the agent might prefer to or be induced to engage in price 
fixing, consider the table below, which calculates the necessary reward percentage for different 
combinations of the probability of detection, wage growth, and interest rate.  I chose detection 
probabilities that reflect upper (.25) and lower ranges (.15) for cartel detection probabilities in 
the U.S. and in Europe.  The lower estimate (.15) is suggested by the empirical study of Bryant 
                                                 
14 The last term of the agent’s gain expression follows because Δw2, in expression (1), is equal to λw2, because the 
reward factor is the same in both periods, and λw2 is equal to λ(1+η)w1. 
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and Eckard in 1991.15  Since then, leniency programs have generated much more information 
about cartel activity, raising the probability of detection substantially.  Ginsburg and Wright 











.25 .01 .02 .14 
  .12 .13 
  .18 .13 
.15 .01 .02 .08 
  .12 .08 
  .18 .07 
      
   Table 1: Reward necessary to induce price fixing by the agent. 
 
 
The numbers in Table 1 indicate that as the probability of detection falls, the reward percentage 
necessary to induce the agent to fix prices falls too.  As wage growth increases relative to the 
interest rate, the reward necessary to induce the agent to engage in price fixing falls. 
 
Table 1 suggests that it is not difficult for the firm to encourage the agent to commit the crime.  
In many of the scenarios considered in the table, a modest compensation premium, sometimes on 
the order of 15 percent, is all that is necessary to induce the agent to commit the crime.  The key 
factors that tend toward the inducement of a violation are the wage reward for the violation, the 
interest rate (low interest rates make the second period payment more valuable), high wage 
growth (relatively high wage in the post-punishment period).  All that the firm needs to do is 
credibly communicate these factors to the agent, and the agent will have the incentives, desired 
by the firm, to violate the law. 
 
This analysis is incomplete because it fails to include the disutility of imprisonment, over and 
above the loss of wage income.  Incorporating such a factor would not be difficult, but it would 
                                                 
15 Peter G. Bryant & E. Woodrow Eckard, Jr., Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught, 73 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 531 (1991) (probability of detection range in the U.S. between 13 and 17 percent); Emannuel 
Combe, Constance Monnier, & Renaud Legal, Cartels: The Probability of Getting Caught in the European Union 
21 (Working paper, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1015061 (estimating a 
probability of detection in the EU between 12.9 and 13.2 percent); Peter L. Ormosi, How Big Is a Tip of the 
Iceberg? A Parsimonious Way to Estimate Cartel Detection Rate 21 (Ctr. for Competition Pol’y, Working Paper No. 
11-6, 2011), available at http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/en_GB/c/document_library/get_file?uu 
id=186cc0ec-a536-406d-9792-603f4f6ed95c&groupId=107435 (probability of detection in the EU between 10 and 
20 percent). 
16 Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 1, at 8.  However, a recent empirical study suggests that the probability of 
detection for pricing fixing is still within the low range of 13 to 17 percent in spite of the introduction of leniency 
programs.  See	Alla Golub et al., The Probability of Price Fixing: Have Stronger Antitrust Sanctions Deterred? 5 




not change the basic message of this analysis, that the firm can easily induce the agent to commit 
the crime.17  Offsetting the effect of this omission is the additional omission from this analysis of 
a payment from the firm to the agent during the period of punishment if he is apprehended.  The 
law does not clearly prevent a firm from compensating an imprisoned employee during his 
prison term.18  If the firm continues to compensate the agent during the punishment period while 
he is imprisoned, the incentive to commit the crime may be considerably greater than this 
analysis suggests.19 
 
Firm Does Not Prefer to Fix Prices 
 
Now, let’s consider the other potential conflict scenario, where the firm does not want to fix 
prices and the agent has an incentive to fix prices.  For this to be the case, the agent must 
perceive a positive net reward from price fixing (which means, using (1), (1 – z)λ – z + 
λ(1+η)/(1+r) > 0).  Given the risk of punishment, the firm can easily eliminate the agent’s 
incentive to price fix by eliminating the reward for price fixing. It follows that if the firm sets the 
reward for price fixing (λ) at zero, the agent will not fix prices.20   
 
However, the relationship between the firm and the agent may be more opaque than this analysis 
suggests.  The agent may be employed under a compensation structure that rewards him for any 
increases in profits to the department in which he works.  Thus, if he engages in price fixing, he 
will be rewarded even if the firm has no incentive to fix prices.  In this case, the agent may be 
induced to fix prices by the within-firm compensation structure, even though the firm suffers as a 
result of his price fixing. 
 
If the firm can identify the agent who is responsible for the price-fixing penalty that it is forced 
to pay, the firm will have an incentive to penalize that agent in order to discourage price fixing.  
If the firm can detect the responsible agent immediately, the firm can terminate the agent.  The 
threat of certain termination would eliminate the agent’s incentive to fix prices. 
 
                                                 
17 Incorporating the disutility of punishment would be equivalent to increasing the punishment period wage loss by 









    
. 
It should be clear that the basic issues raised in the preceding analysis remain.  The break-even reward percentage is 
higher in this case, but if the disutility factor k is not too large, the firm will still be able to induce the agent to fix 
prices with a relatively modest reward. 
18 Connor and Lande, supra note 8, at 440-41 n.54 
19 If the firm continues to pay the agent during the period of punishment, the net gain from committing the violation 
is: 









     
which is positive. 
20 This conclusion is not safe if agents switch firms in the post-punishment phase.  The second firm might reward the 
agent for price fixing in the earlier period.  Thus, even if the agent’s initial firm sets the reward for price fixing at 




Suppose, however, the firm cannot detect the responsible agent in the first period and can only 
detect him in the second, post-punishment, period.  Now, the firm can only respond to the 
discovery that the agent engaged in price fixing by imposing a penalty on the agent in the second 
period.  For example, the firm could terminate the agent in the second period.  If the firm 
terminates the agent in the second period with probability s, the agent’s incentive to fix prices 
becomes 
 
         1
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )




       
,                              (3) 
 
where the third term reflects the reward the agent receives in the second period if he is not 
detected by the firm, and the last term reflects the loss the agent suffers if he is detected by the 
firm and terminated in the second period.21  The last term reflects the assumption that if the agent 
had not engaged in price fixing, he would have earned the normal return from his career.  By 
engaging in price fixing, and being caught and terminated, he loses that return in the post-
punishment period.  If this expression (3) is positive, the agent has an incentive to fix prices.  It is 
easy to show that this incentive condition is positive when the reward for price fixing, λ, is 
greater than the odds of detection by the enforcement authority, z/(1-z), and also greater than the 
odds of detection by the firm, s/(1-s).22 
 
This condition implies that the termination threat by itself is insufficient to deter the agent from 
price fixing.  However, the firm can reduce the agent’s incentive to fix prices by reducing the 
reward for the agent’s impact on current-period profits (λ), increasing the probability of firm 
detection (s), or by increasing the relative wage in the post-punishment period (η).  The lower the 
reward and the greater the wage growth, the stronger is the disincentive to go against the 
employer’s policy.  Thus, consistent with Becker and Stigler,23 the firm can deter malfeasance 
(in this case, price fixing) by the agent through a combination of dismissal and a steeper wage 
profile. 
 
Increasing the Sentence 
 
One response to the underdeterrence problem identified here is to increase the length of the 
sentence imposed on the agent.  If the sentence is increased sufficiently, the agent’s incentive to 
engage in price fixing can be eliminated. 
                                                 
21 This formulation assumes that there is no connection between the firm’s dismissal policy and the enforcement 
authority’s punishment decision.  It may seem more realistic to assume, instead, that the firm will definitely detect 
and dismiss any agent who is detected and punished by the authority.  Under this assumption, the agent’s incentive 
condition is: 
   
1
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )[(1 ) ]
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. 
This expression delivers the same message as the expression in (3) examined in the text. 
22 The reason is that the incentive condition in (3) is equivalent to: 
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23 Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL 




Expand the model to three periods, two periods of punishment and one post-punishment.  Now 
the net reward for the agent becomes 
 










     
                               (4) 
 
As the table below shows, although it is less likely that the agent will have an incentive to fix 
prices, given the longer prison sentence, the firm can still easily find reward levels that induce 
the agent to fix prices.  The required reward levels necessary to induce price fixing 
unsurprisingly increase after the sentence length is increased.  Still, there appears to be nothing 
that prevents the employer from completely offsetting the greater deterrence effect, due to the 
increased sentence, with a greater reward for violating the law.  For example, if the detection 
probability is .25, the interest rate is .01, and wage growth between periods is 2 percent, a 













0.25 .01 .02 .29 
  .12 .27 
  .18 .26 
0.15 .01 .02 .16 
  .12 .15 
  .18 .15 
 
           Table 2: Reward necessary to induce price fixing, enhanced sentence. 
 
 
One possible answer to the agent underdeterrence problem is to just keep increasing the expected 
sentence to the point where it is unlikely that the firm can undo the deterrence effect of the 
threatened sentence.  While increasing the sentence is a possible solution, it runs into several 
constraints.  First, for any plausible increase in the sentence, the firm can probably undo its 
deterrence effect by increasing the reward to the agent, or by steepening the wage profile.  The 
sentence length would have to be increased by a large amount in order to prevent the firm from 
undoing its deterrence effect.  However, increasing the sentence by a factor of five, say from an 
average of 2 years in prison for price fixing to an average of 10 years, would be difficult to get 
courts to accept, after having sentenced within a certain range for many years.  Certainly 
defendants would challenge such sentences as disproportionate, given the nature of the harm 
caused by price fixing.  It would be difficult to defend against proportionality challenges a 
sentence scheme that puts price fixers in prison just as long as most violent criminal offenders.24  
                                                 
24 Specifically, defendants would challenge substantially longer sentences for price fixing as unconstitutionally 
excessive, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Solem v. 
10 
 
The average prison sentence for murder is 149 months (12 years) and the average prison 
sentence for kidnapping is 104 months (9 years).25  Increasing the sentence for price fixing to 10 
years would result in price fixers serving longer sentences than many convicted murderers. 
 
This suggests that the sentence enhancement proposal is unlikely to be a real solution to the 
problem of firms being able to undo the deterrent effect of punishment for price fixing.  It is too 
easy for the firm to undo the deterrence effect for reasonable sentence enhancement levels, and 
to prevent the firm from undoing the effect would require the sort of increase in sentences for 





Doug Ginsburg and Josh Wright propose debarment as a solution to the agent underdeterrence 
problem.26  Under the debarment approach, the agent would be barred from returning to work in 
his industry in the post-punishment period. 
 
Being debarred from returning to the industry, the agent will suffer a loss to the extent that his 
within industry wage in the post-punishment period, w2, exceeds his wage level working outside 
of the industry, w0.  It is plausible that this loss would be substantial, because the agent’s within 
industry wage will reflect the value of his experience in the industry – that is, the market value of 
industry-specific human capital.  The debarment incentive changes the agent’s incentives 
primarily by reducing the value of the promise of a post-punishment reward from the firm (or the 
industry).  Under debarment, the agent’s net reward is therefore: 
 
 
           2 0 21 1
( )
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
if detected you lose first period wage if not detected you get reward
and premium over outside wage in both periods
in later period
w w w
z w z w
r r
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.                                        (5) 
  
Because of the debarment threat, the agent loses his first period wage and the premium over his 
outside-industry wage in the later (post-punishment) period.  However, if the agent is not 
detected, he gains his reward for price fixing in both periods.  Moreover, if the difference 
between the agent’s within-industry and outside-industry wage is trivial, the debarment threat is 
quite weak. 
 
Debarment, like increasing the sentence, makes it less likely that the agent will commit the 
crime. However, note that its effect on the agent can be undone by the firm if it makes the reward 
for price fixing (λ) sufficiently large.  In other words, by promising the agent a sufficiently large 
wage increase if he avoids detection, the firm can largely maintain the agent’s incentive to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).  On comparative excessiveness as a basis for invalidating sentences, see Youngjae Lee, 
The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 727-730 (2005).  
25 Bureau of Justice Statistics Prison Sentences and Time Served for Violence.  
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/PSATSFV.PDF 
26 Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Sanctions, 6 Competition Pol’y Int’l 3 (2010). 
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engage in price fixing after the debarment sanction is adopted under the statute.  To see this point 
in terms of the parameters used earlier, note that (5) can be rewritten as 
 




        
,                                              (6) 
 
which implies that if the firm can set the reward for price fixing λ greater than the odds of 
detection, z/(1-z), then it can guarantee that the agent will still have an incentive to engage in 
price fixing even when facing the threat of debarment.  
 
I have assumed, conservatively, that the firm does not compensate the agent if he is detected and 
punished, during the punishment phase.  However, if the firm compensates the agent while he is 
under punishment,27 and in addition provides a reward if he escapes punishment, the deterrent 
effect of debarment can be largely eliminated. 
 
Some Positive Implications 
 
In addition to revealing the ease with which a firm that has an incentive to fix prices can induce 
its agents to carry out the acts of price fixing, this framework explains some of the puzzling 
features noted about prison sentences.  Most prison sentences in antitrust are imposed on mid-
level employees, well below the top level of management.28  Carve-out agreements, negotiated 
plea deals by the firms in which they specify certain employees for prosecution, tend to sacrifice 
mid-level employees of the firm.29  What explains this pattern? 
 
Return to the incentive analysis of the preceding part.  First, the set of potential agents suitable 
for prosecution will tend to be either mid-level or senior.  Junior employees will seldom be in a 
position to arrange or direct a price fixing agreement with rival firms.  A mid-level agent, unlike 
a senior agent, can be rewarded by the firm after he completes his (typically two-year) sentence.  
With the prospect of such a reward in view, the threat of prosecution against mid-level 
employees can easily be undone by the compensation policies of the firm.  Thus, the U.S. 
sentencing data probably reflect the rational economic response of firms that have incentives to 
engage in price fixing to the enforcement policies of the Justice Department.  The firms can 
induce mid-level employees to break the law and carve them out for later prosecution in plea 
deals.  To the extent such a strategy reduces the expected sanction against the firm, it could tip 
the incentives of some firms in favor of price fixing.  In other words, if in the absence of a carve-
out strategy the firm would not have an incentive to fix prices, the option of a carve-out strategy, 
coupled with a reduced sanction on the firm, might change the firm’s incentives toward 
preferring price fixing.30 
                                                 
27 Connor and Lande, supra note 8, at 440-41 n.54 (noting reports that some companies continue to pay convicted 
agents while they are in prison). 
28 Id. at 440-441. 
29 Id. 
30 In perhaps the most cynical of possibilities, cartel recidivism could be privately optimal for both firms and the 
enforcement agency.  Suppose fines are sufficiently high to deter firms from price fixing, but firms expect to 
negotiate for lower fines by carving out mid-level agents for prosecution.  An equilibrium might arise in which the 






A statute, such as the Sherman Act, that imposes penalties both on the firm and on the agent 
generates the possibility of a conflict in which one party will have an incentive to violate the 
statute while the other party does not.  The basic message of this paper is that the conflict 
scenario in which the firm has an incentive to violate the statute and the agent does not is much 
more worrisome that the reverse scenario.  The firm has many tools at its disposal to discourage 
the agent from violating the statute when the firm prefers to comply with it.  However, if the firm 
has an incentive to violate the statute, it can almost always induce its agent to violate the statute.  
This implies that the preferable approach to deterrence is to treat deterrence at the firm level as a 
higher priority concern than deterrence at the agent level. 
                                                                                                                                                             
prosecution, and the enforcement agency profits from collecting fines from recidivists.  More generally, if the fines 
are not set sufficiently high to deter the firm from price fixing, one might observe a recidivism equilibrium, where 
both the firm and the enforcement agency profit from recidivism. 
